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Logan Teisch 
Force and Fraud in Criminal Law 
Prof. Ristroph 
12/3/14   
Fairness, Equality, and Qualified Immunity in Prison Litigation 
I. Introduction 
 The doctrine of qualified immunity, as it pertains to the prison litigation context, needs to 
change. In prison litigation, qualified immunity protects prison officials from liability when 
prisoners bring a § 1983 claim against them alleging that the officials violated one of their 
protected rights. However, public prisons and private prisons are treated differently under the 
law. As a result, qualified immunity only offers protection for some prison officials, and none at 
all for others. This differing treatment also greatly affects prisoners trying to bring valid claims 
against prison officials, as their chances of succeeding on their claims and recovering damages 
depend largely upon whether they are serving their sentences in a private prison or in a public 
prison.  
Regardless of whether a prisoner is serving out his sentence in a private prison or in a 
public prison, he is nevertheless a “prisoner,” with all of the legal ramifications that entails. In 
addition, regardless of where he is serving out his sentence, the same rights and liberties have 
been stripped away from him. However, not all rights have been lost. One important right that a 
prisoner retains is the Eighth Amendment’s right to be free from the infliction of cruel and 
unusual punishments. Prisoners can bring claims of cruel and unusual punishment against the 
prison guards who watch over them.  
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There are two allegations prisoners can make when bringing Eighth Amendment lawsuits 
against prison officials: allegations of excessive force and allegations of inhumane conditions of 
confinement. While both allegations involve the prison context, they are subject to different legal 
standards. In all Eighth Amendment claims brought by prisoners alleging that prison officials 
used excessive force against them, the key determination will be “whether force was applied in a 
good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause 
harm.”1 Under this standard, if prison officials used force in a malicious or sadistic manner, they 
will be held liable for their actions. In these cases, the extent of the injuries suffered by the 
prisoner is just one factor to consider, along with the need for application of force by the official, 
the relationship between the need for force and the actual force used, the reasonably-perceived 
threat in the view of the official, and any efforts by the official to minimize the amount of force 
exerted.2  
In addition to having the right to be free from excessive force, prisoners also have the 
right to be free from inhumane prison conditions.3 Prison officials must provide “adequate food, 
clothing, shelter, and medical care, and must ‘take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of 
the inmates.’”4 In Eighth Amendment claims alleging inhumane conditions of confinement, 
courts will examine the acts of the officials under a “deliberate indifference” standard. What this 
means is that prison officials will only be held liable if they knew that what they were doing 
subjected prisoners to a substantial risk of serious harm, and they knowingly disregarded that 
risk by failing to take any reasonable measures to abate it.5  
                                                                 
1 Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 7 (1992).  
2 Id.  
3 Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994).  
4 Id. (quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526-27 (1984)). 
5 Id. at 847. 
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While all prisoners have the right to be free from excessive force and inhumane prison 
conditions, some are able to recover damages much more easily than others. The United States 
Supreme Court has made a crucial distinction between private prisons and public prisons. While 
courts have long recognized that public prison guards are entitled to a defense of qualified 
immunity from Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual punishment claims, the Court made it very 
clear in Richardson v. McKnight that this defense does not extend to private prison guards.6 
Therefore, private prison guards are subject to liability where their public counterparts are not. 
This means that it is easier for prisoners to successfully bring meritorious claims of cruel and 
unusual punishment against private guards than it is to do so against public guards.  
The Court in Richardson determined that private prison officials did not need the 
protection of qualified immunity because “[t]he organizational structure [of private prisons] is 
one subject to the ordinary competitive pressures that normally help private firms adjust their 
behavior in response to the incentives that tort suits provide—pressures not necessarily present in 
government departments.”7 This reasoning has resulted in an inequality among the prisoner 
population in this country. Prisoners should have just as much of a chance of succeeding on their 
claims against guards, regardless of whether they are serving time in a private prison or in a 
public prison. They have no say as to whether they are going to serve their time in a public or in 
a private facility. Since they have no say or control in the matter, it is unjust to simply let their 
placement dictate whether or not they will be able to recover damages for any harm inflicted 
upon them by a prison official. Prisoners in private and public prisons alike, who have suffered 
the same intrusion upon their rights, should have an equal opportunity in remedying that wrong.  
                                                                 
6 Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399 (1997). 
7 Id. at 412.  
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Clearly, certain changes need to be made to the current state of the law to help ensure 
equality and fairness among all prisoners in bringing Eighth Amendment claims. I propose that 
instead of abolishing the doctrine of qualified immunity altogether, a few simple changes to the 
existing doctrine can lead to the desired results. In Eighth Amendment lawsuits alleging 
excessive use of force, public prison officials will still be entitled to qualified immunity while 
private officials will not, but the ultimate decision as to whether qualified immunity may be 
asserted will be made by the judge. First, instead of the jury making the final determination as to 
whether or not the Eighth Amendment has been violated, as is the case today, the judge will be 
the one to examine the totality of the circumstances and determine whether or not the prison 
official acted “maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” If the judge finds that the official did 
act with such intent, the private prisoner will then be entitled to recover damages. In a case 
brought by a public prisoner, though, the judge will have to make an additional finding as to 
whether or not it would still be appropriate under the circumstances for the official to assert a 
qualified immunity defense and to not be subject to liability.  
Keeping qualified immunity intact and shifting the decision-making authority to the 
judge will help put prisoners on equal footing with one another. Private prisoners already have an 
easier time recovering damages than public prisoners do, but now it will be easier for public 
prisoners as well because officials will not be able to simply assert qualified immunity at the 
outset of the case. Public prisoners will get the facts and circumstances of their cases heard 
before a judge first, and then the judge will decide whether qualified immunity would be 
appropriate. With these changes to the existing law regarding qualified immunity, fairness and 
equality for all prisoners can be achieved.  
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II. History and Purposes of Qualified Immunity 
 Before discussing any reforms to improve the current state of the law, though, it is 
important to understand the history and purposes behind the doctrine of qualified immunity. First 
of all, prisoners can bring claims of cruel and unusual punishment against prison guards through 
42 U.S.C. § 1983. This statute provides a federal cause of action for someone who has been 
deprived of a federally protected right by another who was acting under the color of state law.8  
Congress first passed the statute within the Civil Rights Act of 1871, which was enacted after the 
Civil War to help ensure that the individual rights of former slaves were enforced equally along 
with everyone else’s individual rights.9 Its main purposes were to “deter state actors from using 
the badge of their authority to deprive individuals of their federally guaranteed rights and to 
provide relief to victims if such deterrence fails.”10 For prisoners, and for anyone else for that 
matter, to bring a claim under § 1983, the deprivation of a constitutionally-protected right, or a 
right protected under any federal law, must first be shown.11 The other part of the claim requires 
the plaintiff to show that the alleged deprivation occurred while the defendant acted with either 
the actual or apparent power of the state behind him, meaning the defendant acted under color of 
law.12  
 Within its plain language, § 1983 makes no mention of any immunity from legal action.13 
However, the Supreme Court has permitted immunity from suit for certain government actors, if 
such immunity existed under the common law. Immunity from liability existed under the 
common law prior to the passage of § 1983 for “‘those governmental functions that 
                                                                 
8 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (Westlaw current  through 09/26/2014).  
9 See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 183 (1961). 
10 Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 161 (1992).  
11 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. 
12 Id. (See United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794 n.7 (1966)).   
13 Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 417 (1976).  
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were…viewed as so important and vulnerable to interference by means of litigation that some 
form of…immunity from civil liability was needed to ensure that they are performed’ with 
independence and without fear of consequences.”14 Another basis for immunity was the idea that 
officials will make mistakes and they must be protected in some way, otherwise they will be 
afraid to act.15 Public officials needed to be shielded “‘from undue interference with their duties 
and from potentially disabling threats of liability.’”16  
The Court’s rationale for providing immunity under § 1983 was that the “tradition of 
immunity was so firmly rooted in the common law and was supported by such strong policy 
reasons that ‘Congress would have specifically so provided had it wished to abolish the 
doctrine.’”17 There are, thus, two prongs that courts use to determine whether immunity should 
be afforded to certain officials sued under § 1983: (1) whether there is history of the immunity at 
common law such that the official would have received immunity prior to the passage of § 1983 
in 1871,18 and (2) whether the purposes that underlie immunity for officials support extending 
the immunity to the defendant at bar.19 Under the first prong, the history of immunity must be 
“firmly rooted” in the common law.20 Under the second prong, the Supreme Court has stated that 
the two primary purposes are to promote effective performance by officers who might otherwise 
be inhibited by the threat of lawsuits21 and to prevent qualified candidates from being deterred 
from public service by threats of liability.22  
 
                                                                 
14 2 Rodney A. Smolla, Federal Civil  Rights Acts §14:28 (3d ed. 2014). 
15 See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 242 (1974).  
16 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 806 (1982). 
17 Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 164 (1992) (quoting Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 555 (1967)).  
18 Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 339-40 (1986).  
19 See Wyatt, 504 U.S. at 164.  
20 14A Glenda K. Harnad et al., C.J.S. Civil  Rights §450 (2014). 
21 See Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 223 (1988). 
22 See Wyatt, 504 U.S. at 167.  
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III. Qualified Immunity in the Prison Litigation Context 
 Courts have recognized two types of immunity: absolute immunity and qualified 
immunity. Absolute immunity has been reserved for legislators, judges, and prosecutors,23 while 
qualified immunity has generally been afforded to officials who exercise significant discretion in 
carrying out their duties.24 The Supreme Court afforded qualified immunity to public prison 
officials for the first time in Procunier v. Navarette.25 Since prison guards are only afforded 
qualified immunity, rather than absolute immunity, that necessarily means there are times when 
they are not going to be protected from civil liability. In the prison litigation context, the 
defendant official has the initial burden of proving that he was acting within the scope of his 
discretionary authority at the time of the incident.26 If the defendant satisfies this first step, then 
the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that immunity is inappropriate.27  
The standard that courts have used to determine if plaintiffs have satisfied their burden 
has been modified over the years. The first test was explained by the Supreme Court in Scheuer 
v. Rhodes, which was the first case in which the Court formally adopted the defense of qualified 
immunity.28 Scheuer established that a police officer was entitled to immunity where the official 
had a reasonable belief that the action taken was appropriate based on the circumstances as they 
appeared at the time, coupled with a good faith belief.29 The Court in Scheuer determined that 
the amount of immunity granted to an official would be based on the amount of discretion he 
                                                                 
23 See Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 372 (1951) (recognizing absolute immunity for legislators); Forrester, 484 
U.S. at 227 (recognizing absolute immunity for judges); Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 493 (1991) (recognizing 
absolute immunity for prosecutors).  
24 Stephen W. Miller, Note, Rethinking Prisoner Litigation: Shifting From Qualified Immunity to a Good Faith 
Defense in § 1983 Prisoner Lawsuits, 84 Notre Dame L. Rev. 929, 937 (2009). 
25 Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555 (1978). 
26 Valdes v. Crosby, 450 F.3d 1231, 1236 (11th Cir. 2006).  
27 Id. 
28 Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974).  
29 Id. at 247-48.  
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was afforded in carrying out the duties of his office.30 The following year, the Court altered its 
analysis of the qualified immunity defense. In Wood v. Strickland, the Court explained the 
objective and subjective portions of the defense. The objective portion of the analysis required 
that the official not disregard any “settled, indisputable law,” and any “basic, unquestioned 
constitutional rights.”31 Regarding the subjective portion of the analysis, the Court held that the 
official also must have been acting with the sincere belief that what he was doing was right.32  
In Procunier, the Court explained that the Strickland standard was a two-part inquiry in 
which the defendant official would be held liable only if he knew or should have known that his 
conduct violated a clearly established constitutional right, or if he acted with malicious intent to 
deprive the plaintiff of a constitutional right.33 Since the Court’s decision in Strickland, though, 
the subjective portion of the analysis has been eliminated. The Court in Harlow v. Fitzgerald 
announced the new standard, which is still the standard used by courts today:  “Government 
officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil 
damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional 
rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”34 Therefore, the subjective intent of the 
official is irrelevant to the determination of whether qualified immunity may be asserted. Courts 
will only undergo an objective analysis. Under this standard, a defendant who acts in good faith 
is not afforded any immunity when he acts contrary to clearly established law, while a defendant 
                                                                 
30 Id. at 246-47.  
31 Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 321-22 (1975). 
32 Id. at 321.   
33 Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555, 562 (1978) (quoting Strickland, 420 U.S. at 322). 
34 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (emphasis added).  
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who acts with intentional malice may be afforded protection because a reasonable person would 
not have known that he was violating a clearly established right.35 
 Much debate has taken place since Harlow regarding the definition of “clearly 
established.” The Supreme Court has held that in order for a right to be clearly established, “[t]he 
contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that 
what he is doing violates that right. This is not to say that an official action is protected by 
qualified immunity unless the very action in question has previously been held unlawful…but it 
is to say that in the light of pre-existing law the unlawfulness must be apparent.”36 Put another 
way, the Court will look to see whether the state of the law at the time the incident took place 
gave the defendant fair warning that his actions were unlawful.37 Some of the various Circuits 
have devised their own definitions of “clearly established,” as well. For example, the Second 
Circuit has held that courts should consider “(1) whether the right in question was defined with 
‘reasonable specificity;’ (2) whether the decisional law of the Supreme Court and the applicable 
circuit court support the existence of the right in question; and (3) whether under preexisting law 
a reasonable defendant official would have understood that his or her acts were unlawful.”38 
Regardless of which definition courts use, it appears that the general inquiry is an objective one, 
examining whether a reasonable person should have known about the legality of his or her 
actions.  
                                                                 
35 Stacey Haws Felkner, Article, Proof of Qualified Immunity Defense in 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 or Bivens Actions Against 
Law Enforcement Officers, 59 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 291, § 2 (2000). 
36 Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987). 
37 Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002). 
38 Romaine v. Rawson, 140 F. Supp. 2d 204, 213 (N.D.N.Y. 2001) (quoting Jermosen v. Smith, 945 F.2d 547, 550 (2d 
Cir. 1991)).  
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 As previously mentioned, the Supreme Court granted qualified immunity to public prison 
officials for the first time in Procunier v. Navarette.39 Using the Strickland test (Harlow had yet 
to be decided), the Court in Procunier found that because there was no established constitutional 
right protecting prisoners’ mail privileges at the time the officials failed to send out the plaintiff’s 
outgoing mail, and because the officials did not act with malice intent to deprive the plaintiff of 
any right or with intent to cause him injury, there was no basis for rejecting the defense of 
qualified immunity.40 Just when it appeared that this issue regarding prison guards and whether 
or not they were afforded the protection of a qualified immunity defense was settled once and for 
all, a new system of prison operations began to take hold just a few years after Procunier was 
decided.  
 
IV. Prison Privatization and Richardson v. McKnight 
 In 1983, Corrections Corporation of America (CCA) was officially incorporated.41 The 
company was founded by three men who wanted to fix the problems with the public prison 
system and to “invent an approach that benefited many.”42 Prison populations were soaring in the 
mid-1980s as a result of lengthy mandated sentences under the war on drugs and the “tough-on-
crime” approach.43 CCA saw an opportunity to create private prisons operated by business, 
rather than by government.44 These prisons would alleviate the prison populations in state 
prisons, which would in turn help the states save money.45 CCA also proclaimed that its 
operations would be transparent and “in many ways just like the correctional facilities of 
                                                                 
39 Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555, 566 (1978).  
40 Id. at 565-66.  
41 The CCA Story: Our Company History, CCA.com, http://www.cca.com/our-history (last visited Nov. 5, 2014). 
42 Id.    
43 J.M. Kirby, Note, Graham, Miller, & the Right to Hope, 15 CUNY L. Rev. 149, 155 (2011).  
44 CCA.com, supra note 41. 
45 Id. 
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government.”46 CCA currently operates 61 facilities in 20 states.47 Today, CCA is just one of a 
number of private prison companies operating private prisons throughout the country, including 
GEO Group and LCS Corrections.48 Since CCA opened the first private prison thirty years ago, 
the population of prisoners across the United States who are housed in privately-operated prison 
facilities has steadily grown. As of the end of 2013, there were 133,044 prisoners held in the 
custody of private prisons throughout the country.49 This is 8.4% of the total United States prison 
population.50 However, private prisons have an even greater impact on the federal level alone: 
19.1% of all federal prisoners are serving their sentences in private prisons.51  
 With the rise of privately-operated prisons and the increasing number of prisoners in 
federal and state custody housed in these facilities, a very important question needed to be 
resolved: Are private prison officials entitled to a qualified immunity defense from § 1983 
liability equal with their public counterparts? The Supreme Court provided a very clear, 
definitive answer to this question in Richardson v. McKnight, an answer that essentially provides 
the basis for the new proposal advocated for today.  
The plaintiff in Richardson brought a § 1983 action against two prison guards, who he 
claimed deprived him of a right secured by the Constitution by placing upon him very tight 
physical restraints.52 The Court then went through the two-pronged analysis set forth in Wyatt 
and reiterated above: it looked both to history and to policy considerations that underlie the grant 
                                                                 
46 Id.  
47 Id. at Locations.  
48 Scott Cohn, Private Prison Industry Grows Despite Critics, NBC News (Oct. 18, 2011, 10:44 AM), 
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/44936562/ns/business -cnbc_tv/t/private-prison-industry-grows-despite-
critics#.VFqoZ_nF-g2. 
49 E. Ann Carson, Prisoners in 2013, Bureau of Just. Stat., at 14 (2014).  
50 Id.  
51 Id.  
52 Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399, 401 (1997). 
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of immunity for government officials.53 As to the first prong, the Court did not find a “firmly 
rooted” tradition of immunity that had been applied to privately employed prison guards.54 
Private contractors were heavily involved in prison management in the United States going as far 
back as the 19th century, but the Court found evidence that prisoners were indeed provided with 
remedies against harm committed upon them by the private prison operators.55 The Court saw 
“no indication of any more general immunity that might have applied to private individuals 
working for profit.”56   
As to the second prong, whether policy considerations dictate in favor or against the 
granting of immunity, the Court admitted that this was a closer question than the issue regarding 
a firmly rooted tradition under the common law.57 The Court explained that the main purposes 
behind qualified immunity are to protect “‘government’s ability to perform its traditional 
functions’ by providing immunity where ‘necessary to preserve’ the ability of government 
officials ‘to serve the public good or to ensure that talented candidates were not deterred by the 
threat of damages suits from entering public service.’”58 Immunity should be granted in instances 
where it is necessary to help ensure that public officials will not be timid in carrying out their 
official duties.59  
Using this general rule, the Court determined that there were other factors in place in a 
private prison system that already sufficiently safeguarded against timidity and aggressiveness. 
For instance, the Court noted that private prison companies are subject to competitive market 
                                                                 
53 Id. at 404.  
54 Id.   
55 Id. at 405. 
56 Id. at 407. 
57 Id.  
58 Id. at 408 (quoting Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 167 (1992)). 
59 Id.  
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pressures.60 The Court found that these competitive pressures meant that guards who are too 
aggressive will face damages that will raise costs, which could lead to the private company being 
replaced.61 At the same time, the threat of replacement also hovers over a company whose guards 
are too timid.62 Other companies who demonstrate an ability to do a safer, more effective job will 
be more appealing to the governments leasing out their prisons.63 Therefore, “marketplace 
pressures provide the private firm with strong incentives to avoid overly timid, insufficiently 
vigorous, unduly fearful, or ‘nonarduous’ employee job performance.”64  
Aside from ensuring effective performance, the need to ensure that talented candidates 
are not deterred by the threat of damages suits is not applicable to the facts in Richardson, the 
Court stated, because private prison employees are covered by insurance and will likely be 
indemnified by the company for any damages a court may order them to pay.65 There is no need 
for immunity because the guards’ employer can operate just like other private companies, rather 
than operating like a government department.66 The Court readily admitted that lawsuits may 
distract employees from their duties, but concluded that the risk of distraction alone is not 
sufficient grounds for immunity.67  
With the failure to satisfy the history requirement of the Wyatt test, and with the absence 
of a need to grant immunity to meet any of the purposes of the defense, the Court emphatically 
refused to afford private prison guards the defense of qualified immunity.68 However, without 
settling the matter, the Court left open the possibility that perhaps private prison guards, such as 
                                                                 
60 Id. at 409.  
61 Id.  
62 Id.  
63 Id.  
64 Id. at 410. 
65 Id. at 411. 
66 Id.  
67 Id.  
68 Id. at 412.  
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the guards in Richardson, could assert an affirmative defense based on good faith, rather than an 
immunity defense.69  This issue was not specifically before the Court in Richardson, though, and 
thus there was no ultimate decision regarding the possibility of raising such a defense.70  
The disparate treatment that public and private prison guards now receive in terms of 
liability results in inequality among not just the guards themselves, but also among the prisoners. 
Denying qualified immunity to private guards means that prisoners in public and private prisons 
will receive unequal results when bringing an Eighth Amendment claim against prison officials. 
Prisoners in private prisons will at least be able to get their claims past summary judgment, for 
the most part, while those in public facilities will get their cases kicked out of court before any 
evidence is allowed to be presented. Justice Scalia made this injustice painfully clear at the end 
of his Richardson dissent when he wrote, “Today’s decision says that two sets of prison guards 
who are indistinguishable in the ultimate source of their authority over prisoners, 
indistinguishable in the powers that they possess over prisoners, and indistinguishable in the 
duties that they owe toward prisoners, are to be treated quite differently in the matter of their 
financial liability.”71 
 
V. Public Prisons vs. Private Prisons 
An examination of public and private prisons makes evident the need for reform 
regarding qualified immunity in the prison litigation context. To be sure, there are stark 
differences between government-run prisons and privately-run correctional facilities. The main 
purpose behind the rise of private prisons in the mid-1980s was to save the states money in 
                                                                 
69 Id. at 413-14. 
70 Id. 
71 Id. at 422. 
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operating their prison systems.72 Private prisons were able to house and manage prisoners at 
much lower costs than the states could, so the states began contracting out their facilities to 
private firms.73 While it was believed that competition for government contracts would provide 
the necessary incentives for private companies to manage prisoners more effectively and 
efficiently, this has proven to be far from the case.  
Professor Mary Sigler has commented that “[t]he traditional market mechanisms for 
disciplining poor performance may not operate effectively in the private prison setting.”74 
Typically in the case of other private services, dissatisfied consumers can demand change and 
improved service. However, the “consumers” in the private prison setting are the prisoners 
themselves, and by virtue of their status, cannot demand any sort of change whatsoever.75 They 
are “virtually powerless to effect change in the face of unsatisfactory prison conditions.”76 
Professor Sigler also notes that prisoners are not the only ones who are left powerless in a case of 
unsatisfactory conditions. Public officials, the ones who are contracting with the private firms to 
run their prison facilities, will not easily be able to cancel a contract with a firm that is not 
performing well, due to the difficulty in finding alternative facilities to house the prisoners.77  
In addition, because the private prison market is dominated by a very small number of 
firms, these firms are the ones with the bargaining leverage when negotiating with governments 
who are under pressure to find a place to house prisoners as quickly as possible.78 These inherent 
circumstances within the private prison system mean that even when there are instances of severe 
                                                                 
72 Mary Sigler, Article, Private Prisons, Public Functions, and the Meaning of Punishment, 38 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 149, 
158 (2010).   
73 Id. 
74 Id. at 160. 
75 Id. 
76 Id.  
77 Id. 
78 Id.   
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prison guard force unduly exerted upon prisoners, there is very little governments can do to 
punish the private firms who are letting that happen under their watch. “When money is the 
state’s primary concern, it will hesitate to rescind contracts even when evidence of abuse is 
considerable, fearing the costs such a move would entail.”79 
Another way private firms avoid accountability is by not providing specific contractual 
terms regarding the number of employees, the level of training those employees receive, as well 
as their salaries and benefits.80 While governments can try to demand that these terms be 
specified, it is the private firms who hold the bargaining leverage in these negotiations due to the 
fact that there are only a limited number of private firms for governments to choose from. 
Therefore, government demands do not carry sufficient weight in these situations to cause 
private companies to change their ways. Professor Sharon Dolovich wrote that specifying any of 
these terms would increase the costs of contracting and greatly impede the private contractors’ 
ability to cut labor costs, which in turn hurts their main objective of minimizing expenses.81  
Without specifying those crucial contract terms, private prison officials have less training 
and less experience than those in the public sector. As one might guess, less training and less 
experience has led private prisons to become the scenes of more physical violence than public 
prisons.82 Without obtaining adequate knowledge of due process and even of the law itself, these 
private guards are left to their own devices when making the most critical of decisions in the 
prison setting.83 In addition, they receive lower wages than their counterparts in public prisons.84 
What these circumstances ensure is that private prison firms attract younger employees, with less 
                                                                 
79 Sharon Dolovich, Article, State Punishment and Private Prisons, 55 Duke L. J. 437, 505 (2005).  
80 Id.   
81 Id.  
82 Id. at 502.  
83 Mary Sigler, Article, Private Prisons, Public Functions, and the Meaning of Punishment, 38 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 149, 
162 (2010).    
84 Id. 
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experience and less training, all of which contributes to a higher turnover rate.85 Professor Sigler 
writes that private prison employees “are less likely to develop the commitment to public values 
and shared norms of professionalism that contribute to rule compliance and promotion of the 
common good.”86 To sum up, “[T]he private sector is more interested in doing well than in doing 
good.”87 
Perhaps most concerning, though, is that the performances of the guards take place 
behind closed doors “in the service of beneficiaries who lack meaningful recourse in cases of 
poor performance.”88 In light of all of these obstacles to accountability, Professor Sigler writes 
that these are all “challenges to effective oversight in precisely those circumstances that call for 
special vigilance.”89 
Clearly there are significant differences between public and private prisons. However, 
these distinct prison systems share more similarities than one might think, indicating that perhaps 
they should share some more similarities in terms of the legal standards that apply to them, as 
well. As Professor Dolovich writes, “[T]he private prisons of today function very much like 
public prisons, only with a cheaper labor force.”90 Dolovich notes some of the most important 
similarities between public prisons and private prisons: the discretion and power the guards 
possess, the high pressure of the prison environment, and inmates’ proclivity to violence.91 
Prison guard force against prisoners is a real concern in all prisons, no matter who is running the 
operation.   
                                                                 
85 Id. 
86 Id.  
87 Id. at 163. 
88 Id. at 161.  
89 Id.  
90 Sharon Dolovich, Article, State Punishment and Private Prisons, 55 Duke L. J. 437, 501 (2005).  
91 Id.  
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Adding further to the similarities, Professor Dolovich notes that public prisons are not 
even entirely publicly-run in each and every aspect of their organization. Governments are 
involved with the private sector for at least some of the services that public prisons provide.92 
The most common services for which almost all prison facilities across the country contract out 
to for-profit firms include food services, medical treatment, dental treatment, psychiatric 
treatment, and even garbage collection and educational programming.93 It comes as no surprise 
that public prisons are doing this to help cut costs. As Dolovich notes, these services often 
directly affect a prisoner’s well-being and helps contribute to violence in public and private 
prisons alike.94  
 To conclude her argument, Professor Dolovich sums it up best when she writes, “[P]ublic 
prisons, too, contract with for-profit providers for the provision of essential prison services as a 
cost-saving measure. And in public prisons, too, correctional officers enjoy considerable power 
over prisoners absent effective oversight mechanisms. It should thus be unsurprising that, in 
terms of day-to-day structure and functioning, private prisons operate pretty much like public 
prisons—and that the conditions in each are far from safe or humane.”95   
Despite the differences between public and private prisons, which continue to provide 
validity to the Court’s holding in Richardson, there are sufficient similarities to suggest that there 
is no reason to treat prisoners in these facilities any different from one another. Prisoners in both 
public and private prisons are under the supervision of prison officials whose conduct is not 
often effectively monitored. This public and private prison distinction should not foreclose one 
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group of prisoners from recovering damages from these officials over another simply because of 
who operates the facilities they are housed in.  
 
VI. The Need for Reform 
 What the above discussion has demonstrated is that despite the similarities between 
public and private prisons, public and private prisoners are not treated equally under the law in 
terms of being able to remedy an infringement by a prison official upon their protected rights. 
Under the current system and state of the law, public prison guards are not subject to § 1983 
liability for the actions they take in their official capacity, as long as they did not violate a clearly 
established right of which a reasonable person should have known. The Supreme Court has 
deemed these guards to be entitled to this qualified immunity defense from liability so that they 
can effectively perform their duties without fear of being sued for their actions. The Court has 
said that this gives them incentive to discipline. Essentially, the idea is to help ensure that guards 
will keep prisoners in line and under control while they are under the guards’ watch. However, 
private prison guards are not entitled to a qualified immunity defense. The Court in Richardson 
said that private guards do not need incentive to discipline like the public guards do. They have 
enough incentive to do their jobs because their employer can just simply be replaced with any 
other private firm who is willing to undertake the challenge of running a prison.96  
As previously mentioned, prisoners are greatly affected by this differing treatment 
between public and private guards. Prisoners in public and private facilities, just like the guards 
in those facilities, are treated differently under the law despite the fact that there is nothing 
among their day-to-day activities that differentiates them. Prisoners are prisoners, regardless of 
where they are assigned to serve out their sentences. It does not make a difference whether a 
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prisoner is housed in a private prison or in a public prison—he is still stripped of his liberty and 
freedom. However, a private prisoner will have a much easier time bringing a § 1983 claim 
against a private guard than will a public prisoner against a public guard, by virtue of the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Richardson not to extend qualified immunity to private prison 
officials. A public prisoner’s suit will likely be dismissed at the summary judgment stage, while 
a private prisoner’s suit will much more likely be heard and decided on the merits.  
The Court does not make any mention of how Richardson affects prisoners. The Court 
offers no rationale for why private prisoners should more easily be able to recover damages from 
a guard who violated their constitutional right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment than 
should public prisoners. If they have suffered the same wrong, why should they not have an 
equal opportunity to remedy that wrong? Prisoners, by definition, have lost certain rights. But 
they have not lost all rights, which the fact that they can even attempt to bring a § 1983 action 
makes clear.  
As Professor Sharon Dolovich explained in great detail, and as I recounted above, private 
and public prisons do share some similarities. Both facilities are scenes of violence and both 
facilities lack any sort of effective oversight measures to protect against potential abuses being 
carried out within their walls. Because the facilities themselves are not completely different, one 
can infer that the prisoners in private and public facilities are not that different, either. So why, 
then, has the Supreme Court determined that it shall effectively treat prisoners differently based 
on where they are housed? They perform the same tasks and serve the same roles within the 
prison system. It makes sense, then, that all prisoners should be treated equally. More 
specifically, all prisoners should have the same opportunities to have their § 1983 claims against 
prison officials heard on their merits. 
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 Under my proposal of changes to be made to the doctrine of qualified immunity, private 
and public prisoners will have the same chances of successfully bringing a § 1983 claim against 
prison officials. This is the goal the Supreme Court should be striving for, rather than creating a 
large chasm between the public and private sectors in the correctional system. These changes 
need to be made because they will help ensure equality and fairness regarding certain aspects of 
a § 1983 lawsuit. Prisoners will not have to worry about their meritorious claims getting 
dismissed before any facts of the case have even been revealed. No longer will the case be where 
two prisoners who were subjected to the same amount of force by prison officials will have one 
of their cases summarily dismissed and one of their cases heard on the merits simply because of 
whether the officials were employed by the government or by a private entity.  
 
VII. Prior Proposals of Reform 
As is made evident above, this injustice in the law regarding prisoners should not be 
allowed to continue. The status quo must change. It is not surprising, then, that since Richardson, 
numerous proposals regarding the disposition of § 1983 claims brought against officials by 
prisoners have been suggested. While any change is better than maintaining status quo, I will 
propose a more preferable solution, of which neither of the following proposals makes mention. 
Among the most radical of suggestions that has been proposed in the wake of Richardson 
is to completely abolish qualified immunity in the prison litigation context and instead provide 
prison guards, all prison guards, with a good faith defense.97 Stephen Miller determined the 
contours of this defense by using Justice Stevens’s dissent in Procunier.98 Under this standard, a 
guard would have no immunity from suit if he either (1) knew or should have known that the 
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actions he was taking in his official capacity would violate the prisoner’s constitutional rights, or 
(2) if he acted with malice or with intent to cause injury.99 Miller writes that one of the benefits 
of this type of defense is that it would protect those who reasonably believed that their actions 
were legal, as well as not protect those who acted with malice.100 “Such a fault-based system 
promotes a better-functioning justice system.”101  
While this new defense certainly is beneficial for plaintiffs and opens the door for them 
to more likely be able to successfully bring claims, it also benefits prison officials, as well as the 
courts.102 Applying this standard to all guards, regardless of whether they are private or public, 
will produce consistent results in factually-similar circumstances.103 Courts will have more 
guidance as to how to decide such cases and, with consistent case law as to how a court would 
view a factual scenario, prison officials can better organize the training of their guards to ensure 
that they are less likely to engage in prohibited actions.104 Stephen Miller argues that “[s]uch a 
shift would make it easier for prisoners with meritorious claims to have their cases heard” and it 
would “introduce a measure of consistency and fairness with respect to prison guard defendants 
in § 1983 lawsuits.”105  
Another possible solution is to simply judge officials’ conduct based on a heightened 
negligence standard. Professor Sharon Dolovich explained what this entails when defining 
“cruelty” in terms of Eighth Amendment prison conditions claims.106 This same standard could 
be used to determine if a prison guard can claim immunity from § 1983 excessive force claims. 
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Under such a standard, if prisoners “were subjected to a substantial risk of serious harm of which 
a reasonably attentive prison official would have known,” than the official would not be entitled 
to any immunity from liability.107 However, if the prison guard’s acts did not pose an 
objectively-perceived substantial risk of serious harm, the guard could claim immunity. This is 
essentially the Eighth Amendment standard used by the courts in prison conditions claims 
(without the subjective component), but that does not preclude it from being used in claims of 
excessive force.  
If a change were to be made to the current law, guards would probably prefer that this be 
the replacement. However, on its face, a “substantial risk of serious harm” seems to be a fairly 
high burden for a plaintiff prisoner to satisfy in excessive force claims. While this standard still 
allows for more cases to be heard on the merits and not just summarily tossed out of court, it is 
questionable whether this makes it any easier for prisoners to successfully bring their claims, 
which of course is a main priority in reforming this area of the law.  
Professor Dolovich makes mention of another standard: the strict liability standard.108 
This is certainly more favorable to prisoners than the heightened negligence standard because 
here they would be able to recover damages regardless of any good intentions the guard may 
have had.109 However, even Dolovich acknowledges the weaknesses of such a standard. In cases 
brought directly against individual guards, strict liability “risks unfairness by foreclosing officers 
from showing that nothing in their conduct, or in the institutional context more generally, 
indicated insufficient concern with prisoners’ needs.”110 
                                                                 
107 Id. at 948.  
108 Id. at 964. 
109 Id. at 965.  
110 Id. at 966. 
25 
 
One final suggestion that could be used to replace qualified immunity is to impose a 
deliberate indifference standard on the guards’ conduct. “With deliberate indifference lying 
somewhere between the poles of negligence at one end and purpose or knowledge at the other, 
the Courts of Appeals have routinely equated deliberate indifference with recklessness.”111 
Doretha Van Slyke argues that this is beneficial to prison officials because it prevents mere 
accidents and negligence from forming the basis of a constitutional violation.112 At the same 
time, it is beneficial to prisoners because “it does not place an onerous burden of proof on the 
inmate.”113 However, perhaps our correctional officers should be entitled to a bit more protection 
than “recklessness” when it comes to acting in such a high-anxiety, tension-filled location as a 
prison.  
 
VIII. New Proposal 
The problem with these aforementioned solutions is that the Supreme Court is unlikely to 
completely abolish qualified immunity altogether in the prison litigation context, especially 
given its history under the common law. If reform is going to occur, it appears that changes to 
the existing doctrine itself are going to have to be made, rather than simply wholeheartedly doing 
away with the doctrine. The main purpose behind reform is that prisoners in all types of prisons 
should have an equal opportunity in bringing a successful claim of excessive force against prison 
officials. There needs to be more equality and fairness in the disposition of these § 1983 claims. 
If reform meets these goals, equality and fairness can certainly be accomplished. 
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I now propose the following changes to Eighth Amendment lawsuits alleging excessive 
use of force: Instead of the jury making the final determination as to whether or not the Eighth 
Amendment rights of a prisoner have been violated, as is the case today, the judge will ultimately 
determine whether or not the prison official acted “maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” 
After examining the totality of the circumstances, if the judge finds that the official did act with 
such intent, the private prisoner will then be entitled to recover damages, because private prison 
officials are not entitled to a qualified immunity defense. In a case brought by a public prisoner, 
though, the judge will have to make an additional finding as to whether or not it would be 
appropriate under the circumstances for the public prison official to assert a qualified immunity 
defense. Under this new standard, public prison officials will still be entitled to a qualified 
immunity defense, while private prison officials will not, but the ultimate decision as to whether 
qualified immunity can be asserted in a given case will be made by the judge.  
The burden of proof will be on the plaintiff prisoner to demonstrate to the court that the 
official acted maliciously and sadistically. In addition, the extent of the injuries sustained by the 
prisoner will be just one factor to consider, as will be the subjective intent of the prison official. 
Again, the judge will look at the totality of the circumstances in making a final determination, 
with no one factor being dispositive.  
Under this new standard, prison guards will be held accountable for their egregious 
conduct. They will no longer be able to hide behind the cloak of a qualified immunity defense if 
their conduct did not violate a clearly established right of which a reasonable person should have 
known. By virtue of their positions, guards have inherent power to discipline prisoners and 
maintain peace and order within the prison environs. With this new test, however, they will have 
to think more carefully about the actions they take.  
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This new standard also benefits prisoners because it puts them on equal footing with one 
another in terms of bringing a claim against a prison official. In addition, those prisoners who 
have suffered even the most serious harm will not have their cases simply thrown out of court 
due to an immediate invocation of qualified immunity by the defendant. All prisoners with 
legitimate claims will have an equal chance of getting their cases heard. As Stephen Miller 
writes, “We must be mindful…that there are indeed meritorious claims that arise out of the 
prison context and that we have an obligation to ensure that the rights of some of our most 
vulnerable citizens are not being trampled.”114 This new standard helps fulfill that obligation.  
 
IX. Conclusion 
The defense of qualified immunity to § 1983 excessive force claims in the prison 
litigation context needs to be overhauled. It currently protects prison officials from facing 
liability for their actions, no matter how extreme, as long as they did not violate a clearly 
established right. Even if this were acceptable, this immunity only applies to public prison 
guards, and not to their private counterparts. This has resulted in unfairness and inequality 
among prisoners in these different prisons, which now needs to be rectified. Prisoners, when 
bringing Eighth Amendment claims of excessive force against the officials who watch over 
them, need to be treated equally under the law, no matter who employs those officials.  
To accomplish this goal, all legitimate claims of excessive force brought by prisoners 
against prison officials must be heard by a judge. The judge will decide whether the Eighth 
Amendment has been violated, and the judge will decide whether public prison officials can 
assert qualified immunity. With this new standard, prisoners with meritorious claims will have 
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an equal opportunity to successfully bring a § 1983 lawsuit against officials. This new test 
creates fairness and equality for all, certainly much more so than does the current state of the 
law.      
    
 
